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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
CLARENCE H. REDDING, TOM
G. REDDING, and BERT W.
REDDING, individually,

Case No. 16935

Defendants and
Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent Western Surety Company (hereinafter
"Western Surety") seeks indemnity from Defendants-Appellants
Clarence H. Redding, Tom G. Redding and Bert M. Redding (hereinafter "Reddings") for sums paid by it under a Motor Vehicle
Dealer's Bond issued to Redding Associates, Inc. on the basis
of indemnity agreements contained in Reddings' bond applications.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On June 7, 1978, Western Surety filed a Complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County seeking
judgment for $2,550.00 against Reddings based upon a claim it
had paid to another automobile dealer as surety for Redding
Associates, Inc.

Since the facts were not disputed, and since
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determination of the case turned upon interpretation of the
provisions of the bond and the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act,
Chapter 3 of Title 41, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended),
the parties entered into a written stipulation of facts.

Cross

motions for summary judgment were heard on oral argument on
November 23, 1979.

There was no transcript of the hearing.

The court ultimately entered an Order and Judgment in favor
of Western Surety on January 25, 1980.*
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's order of
January 25, 1980 granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellants further seek an order directing summary judgment in
their favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under Utah's Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act, UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-3-16(1)

(1953, as amended) all automobile dealers must

procure a surety bond as a condition of becoming licensed and
doing business.

In February, 1976, the Reddings made the

appropriate applications, and a bond was issued by Western

*The court had initially entered judgment for Western
Surety on November 30, 1979. Reddings subsequently objected
-to the content of the Judgment because it did not reflect a
finding from the bench that they had neither engaged in fraud
nor had fraudulent intent in the subject transaction and,
further, that judgment was granted in favor of western Surety
solely on the court's finding that Reddings had furnished an
automobile purchaser with defective title contrary to the
requirement of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 (1953) R. 62. The
January 25, 1980 amended Order and Judgment incorporated
those findings.
(R. 64.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Surety to Redding Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation, on
February 17, 1976.

Copies of the applications and bond are

appended as Exhibits "A" and "B", respectively.
In August, 1976, Redding Associates, Inc., doing business
as Redding Auto Sales, purchased a 1972 CJ-5 Jeep bearing
Alabama title, paying fair value for the vehicle.

Thereafter, Auto

Exchange, Inc., another automobile dealer, became interested
in buying the jeep from Redding Auto Sales.

On August 27, 1976,

in contemplation of the purchase, Nick Smith, an employee of
Auto Exchange, accompanied Clarence H. Redding to the Utah
State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office at 2100 South
and State Streets in Salt Lake City.

The certificate of title

was presented to the clerk at the DMV, who examined it and
informed both men that the title was in good order.

(R.

34.)

On that same day, Auto Exchange purchased the jeep from Redding
Auto Sales and received the title.
Auto Exchange then resold the jeep.

Subsequent to that

sale, it was discovered that the jeep was a stolen vehicle.

The

jeep, then located in California, was returned to the lienholder of the true owner.

(R. 36.)

Auto Exchange thereafter made written demand upon Western
Surety to make good its loss under Redding Associates' Motor
Vehicle Dealer's Bond.

Western Surety, without making any demand

upon Reddings, and without contacting or consulting them, paid
Auto Exchange's claim for $2,500.00.

On March 8, 1978, Western
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Surety made demand upon Reddings to indemnify it, pursuant to
the indemnity agreements in Reddings' bond applications, for
the $2,550.00 paid to Auto Exchange.

Reddings, believing that

the claim was not covered by the surety bond and that they had
a meritorious defense to Auto Exchange's claim, refused to
indemnify Western Surety.

On June 7, 1978, Western Surety

filed the action resulting in this appeal.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the

loss arose because Reddings violated UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2
(1953) by giving another automobile dealer defective title to
a vehicle when they neither knew that the vehicle was stolen
nor that title was defective.
2.

Whether the lower court erred by failing to find

that Western Surety acted as a volunteer when it paid Auto
Exchange, thereby relieving Reddings of any duty to indemnify
it.
3.

Whether the lower court erred by failing to find that

any obligation that may be owing to Western Surety by virtue
of its payment to Auto Exchange is the debt of a bona fide
corporation, for which Reddings are not individually liable.
ARGUMENT
(Preliminary Statement)
This is not an action in which an injured purchaser seeks
damages from a used car dealer from whom he bought a stolen
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automobile.

The purchaser here, another auto dealer, chose

instead to assert its claim directly against Reddings' surety.
As a result, this case involves a claim for indemnity arising
from the relationship of principal and surety ~ a relationship
mandated by statute for automobile dealers.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-16 (1953) requires that automobile
dealers procure a bond as a condition of doing business.

While

dealers may be subject to broad liability in their transactions
with purchasers, the surety's obligation on the bond is expressly
limited by the Code.

Stated simply, the question here is whether,

on the facts of this case, Western Surety had any obligation
under Reddings' bond to pay the claim of Auto Exchange, or
whether in so doing it acted as a volunteer.
POINT I
REDDINGS' INNOCENT CONDUCT IN THE
SALE OF THE STOLEN JEEP TO AUTO
EXCHANGE IS NOT WITHIN THE AMBIT
OF WESTERN SURETY'S OBLIGATION
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-18.
A.

Utah law specifically limits the rights of action

against a surety for losses sustained in transactions with
automobile dealers.

The dealer's bond that Reddings obtained

from Western Surety was the standard form of bond prescribed
by UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-16(1)

(1953).

As mandated by that

statute, the bond was "approved as to form by the attorney
general of the State of Utah, and conditioned that said applicant
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shall conduct his business as a dealer without fraud or
fraudulent representation, and without the violation of any
of the provisions of this act."
The rights of action available against an automobile
dealer's surety on the bond are set forth in UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-3-18, which provides:
If any person shall suffer loss or damage by
reason of fraud, fraudulent representation or
violation of any of the provisions of this act
by a licensed dealer or one of his salesmen
. . . , such person shall have a right of action
against such dealer, and/or the automobile
salesman guilty of the fraud, fraudulent representation or violation of any of the provisions
of this act, and/or the sureties upon their
respective bonds.
It is clear from the language of § 41-3-18 that the
legislature, in conjunction with its regulation of automobile
dealers, intended to confer certain rights and remedies upon
persons who conduct business with licensed dealers, including
a direct right of action upon the dealer's bond.

It is equally

clear from the language of the statute that the legislature
intended to limit the scope of protection under the dealer's
bond to situations involving loss resulting from either the
dealer's fraud or his violation of the statutory provisions
regulating the conduct of his business.*
These limitations on the statutory right of action were
recognized by this court in Lawrence v. Ward, 5 U.2d 257, 300

*The statute, of course, does not preclude other causes
of action which an injured purchaser could assert against the
dealer.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

P.2d 619 (1956).

After holding that the dealer's bond "was

intended to protect all persons doing business with another
in his capacity as a licensed motor vehicle dealer," the Court
went on to examine the transactions in that case "to determine
whether they fall within the purview of U.C.A. 1953, 41-3-18 .
for which recovery could be had on the surety bond.

II

300 P.2d

at 622.
In the instant case, the lower court specifically found
that Reddings "engaged in no fraud or fraudulent intent in the
specific transaction in question."

(R. 64.)

Therefore, in order

to sustain the trial court's judgment, liability must be predicated
upon some violation of the act resulting in a loss which Western
Surety was obligated under the statute to pay.
B.

There is no strict liability under the Motor Vehicle

Dealer's Act for innocent delivery of a defective certificate
of title.

The lower court granted summary judgment for Western

Surety based solely on its finding that Reddings "supplied the
purchaser of the automobile in question [with] a defective title
contrary to the requirement of Utah Code Annotated, Cahpter 3 of
Title 41 (1953, as amended)."

(R. 64-65.)

Although the written

judgment refers only generally to violation of Chapter 3 of Title 41
(R. 65), Western Surety argued below, and the court ruled from
the bench, that the specific provision violated by Reddings was
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 (1953). That section provides:

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Every person, firm, or corporation upon the
sale and delivery of any used or secondhand motor
vehicle shall within forty-eight hours thereof
deliver to the vendee, and endorsed according
to law, a certificate of title, issued for said
vehicle by the state tax commission.
It was Western Surety's contention that delivery of title under
§

41-3-2 "implies that this title should be good and sufficient by

law on the vehicle

"

(R. 50.)

In other words, according

to Western Surety, delivery of defective title - even innocently is no delivery at all within the meaning of § 41-3-2.
In determining whether Reddings' delivery of the defective
title was a violation of § 41-3-2 and, if so, the type of violation
for which a right of action exists against the surety under
§

41-3-18, the underlying purpose of Chapter 3 of Title 41 must

be considered.

The Motor Vehicle Dealer's Act is a regulatory

statute designed to govern automobile dealers in the conduct of
their business.

It provides criminal sanctions for violation of

its provisions (§ 41-3-2) and specifies conduct which will be
deemed unlawful and a violation of the Act.

The language of

§ 41-3-23, enumerating prohibited acts and omissions, requires that
a dealer act "knowingly" or "intentionally" or "unfairly" in many
instances.

The intent of the legislature in regulating auto-

mobile dealers was to protect the public from fraudulent acts
and intentional misconduct by sellers of new and used cars. *

*

UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-1 (repealed 1967), which dealth with used
cars brought into the state for resale, required that the dealer's
bond cover losses occasioned by simple failure of title as well as
fraud and breach of warranty.
That provision was repealed in 1967.
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The lower court apparently concluded that even innocent
delivery of defective title violated § 41-3-2, requiring 48-hour
delivery of the certificate, and that such violation conferred
a right of action against Reddings' surety on the bond.

Such

interpretation not only fails to consider the goal of the act
to prevent fraud and intentional misconduct by dealers, but
also fails to account for the only provision of Chapter 3,
Title 41 dealing with stolen vehicles.

Under § 41-3-23(3), it

is a violation of the act for a dealer
[t]o knowingly purchase, sell, transport, dismantle or otherwise acquire, dispose of or
handle a stolen vehicle.
[Emphasis added.]
It is uncontroverted that Reddings had no knowledge at the time
of the transaction that the jeep had been stolen.

Without the

requisite scienter, there could be no violation of § 41-3-23(3).
To maintain that innocent handling of a stolen vehicle does not
violate the act and does not confer a right of action under
§

41-3-18, but that innocent transfer of the certificate of title

in the same transaction does violate the act and does confer
such a right of action places an inharmonious and irreconcilable
construction on the two provisions.

In view of the express

requirement that handling a stolen vehicle be "knowing" to
constitute a violation, there can be no strict liability where
the dealer has made a good faith effort to comply with § 41-3-2
by delivering a title valid on its face and found to be in good
order by the Department of Motor Vehicles.

A finding of liability

in this case would be equivalent to holding that a dealer and his
surety are title insurers of automobiles, regardless of their knowSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services
Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
ledge on the conduct
ofand the
buyer.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C.

Even if Reddings' delivery of the defective title

was a violation of the act, Auto Exchange was precluded by its
own conduct from maintaining an action under UTAH CODE ANN.
§

41-3-18.
The right of action against a dealer or his surety

provided by §41-3-18 is available only where the loss or
damage is suffered by reason of the dealer's fraud or violation
of the act.

It is apparent from the facts of the subject

transaction that the loss incurred by Auto Exchange resulted
from its own conduct in accepting the certificate of title,
and not as a result of any violation of § 41-3-2 that Reddings
may innocently have committed.
The facts show that an employee of Auto Exchange went
to the Department of Motor Vehicles with Clarence Redding to
ascertain the validity of the Alabama title.

The clerk's

representation that the title was in good order was made to
both men.

Based upon that representation, the sale of the jeep

and delivery of the title to Auto Exchange was consummated on
the same day.

Both dealers had access to the same information

and chose to conduct their transaction in reliance thereon.

The

loss which Auto Exchange later sustained was incurred through its
own conduct; if there was any violation of the act by Reddings,
Auto Exchange acquiesced in that violation and waived its right
to claim damages as a result thereof.

In Lawrence v. Ward,

5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 {1956), this Court was presented

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with a claim against a dealer's surety bond predicated upon
violation of § 41-3-2 for failure of the dealer to deliver
the certificate of title to the purchaser within forty-eight
hours.

The claimant bank had issued a check in the names of

the dealer and the purchaser of an automobile in exchange for
the purchaser's promissory note.

It thereafter cashed the

check bearing only the dealer's endorsement.

When the dealer

subsequently could not deliver the certificate of title, the
purchaser refused to endorse the check, which had already
been paid to the dealer.

In rejecting the bank's claim for

damages notwithstanding the

dealer's complete failure to

deliver the title, this Court said:
It was obvious to the bank that the check was
not properly endorsed and it had no right to
rely on the expectation that the signature of
the co-payee could be obtained at a later date.
The loss of the bank occurred by reason of its
own negligence and prior to the time when it
was discovered that United Auto Sales could
not deliver title, and it cannot now obtain
judgment against the bond.
300 P.2d at 622-623 (Emphasis added.)
The same reasoning is equally applicable in this case.

Auto

Exchange could not have obtained a judgment against Reddings'
surety bond since the loss occurred by reason of its own conduct
and not in reliance upon the acts of Reddings.
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POINT II
WESTERN SURETY ACTED AS A
VOLUNTEER WHEN IT HONORED THE
CLAIM OF AUTO EXCHANGE; IN SO DOING,
IT RELIEVED REDDINGS OF ANY
DUTY TO INDEMNIFY IT.
The applications for Redding Associates' surety bond
provide that in consideration of Western's issuing the bond,
the applicants "agree to indemnify

• the said Company from

and against any liability, and for all lost, cost, charges,
suits, damages, counsel fees and expenses of whatever kind or
nature which said company shall at any time sustain or incur,
for or by reason, or in consequence of said company having
become surety . .

II

(Emphasis added.)

It is hornbook law that "[i]ndemnity against losses
does not cover losses for which the indemnitee is not liable
to a third person, and which he improperly pays."
Indemnity §33.

41 Am. Jur. 2d,

Western Surety voluntarily settled Auto

Exchange's claim without making any demand upon Reddings and
without contacting or consulting them.

In so doing it covered

a loss which was not within the scope of either party's obligations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-18 (1953).

In Carson v.

Geis Irrigation Co. of Kansas, Inc., 211 Kan. 406, 507 P.2d 295,

(1973), the court said:
While the fact of voluntary payment does not
negative the right to indemnity; legal liability,
i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence
of the obligation to plaintiff or a third

-12-
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party that cannot be legally resisted is a
fundamental prerequisite to recovery by
an indemnitee who has made a voluntary
payment.
[Citations omitted.]
Id. at 300.
Western Surety either failed to properly investigate the facts
of the transaction or to understand the legal ramifications.
In either event, by paying a claim which did not arise through
either Reddings' fraud or violation of the Motor Vehicle Dealer's
Act, it foreclosed defenses that could have been asserted against
Auto Exchange.

Because Western Surety acted as a volunteer on

an obligation it legally could have resisted, it has no right to
indemnity from Reddings on the claim.
POINT III
ANY OBLIGATION THAT MAY BE OWING
TO WESTERN SURETY BY VIRTUE OF ITS
PAYMENT TO AUTO EXCHANGE IS
THE DEBT OF A BONA FIDE CORPORATION,
FOR WHICH REDDINGS ARE NOT LIABLE.
In their Answer to Western Surety's Complaint, Reddings
denied that they had applied for the bond in their individual
capacities or that they had any obligation to indemnify Western
Surety thereunder.

At oral argument on the motions for sununary

judgment, counsel for the Reddings argued that any obligation
owing to Western Surety in this matter was the corporate debt of
Redding Associates, Inc. and not that of the individual defendants.
However, the issue was not addressed by the lower court in its
ruling.
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Western Surety at all times was aware that i t was dealing
with a corporate entity and not with the Reddings as individuals.
On each application for the surety bond, the box marked
"Corpora ti on" was checked.

In the space for the name of the obligee

each application was marked "dba Redding Auto Sales, Inc."

Al-

though the applications were executed by the Reddings without
reference to their corporate capacity, there is no indication
that the Reddings, in signing on behalf of the corporate applicant,
intended to become personal guarantors of the corporation's
indemnity agreement.

And where there is doubt or uncertainty

as to the intent of an indemnity agreement, i t is the policy of
this Court to construe the contract strictly against the party
preparing it.

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,

17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 914 (1965).

Accord, Howe Rents

Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966).

The

applications and bond were standard Western Surety forms.
The bond was applied for and issued on behalf of the
corporation.

It is clear that the Reddings as individuals cannot

possibly be held liable for any obligation arising in connection
with the corporation's surety bond.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the authorities
cited herein, Appellants respectfully pray that the lower court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of western Surety be

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reversed, and that this Court direct that summary judgment be
entered in their favor.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of June, 1980.

ROBERT D.
Attorneys

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing Brief of Appellants was HAND DELIVERED to David H.
Epperson of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, Attorneys for
Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
this 4th day of June, 1980.
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